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Abstract 
In this paper we model the pattern of international trade, and technological innovation and imitation 
between industrialized and developing regions, when preferences are nonhomothetic. By and large, models 
of the dynamics of North-South trade impose the assumption of unit income elasticity for all consumption 
goods. We relax this assumption and incorporate the insight from Engel’s Law: The budget share allocated 
to necessities falls with income. Since the composition of individual consumption depends on income, 
aggregate demand for newly invented goods depends not only on the distribution of income across 
countries but also within countries. To account for the impact of income distribution, we introduce 
preferences where consumers rank indivisible goods according to a hierarchy of both needs and desires. In 
the model we assume that the distribution of wealth is unequal in the less developed country and even in 
the industrialized country. We show that the composition of the aggregate consumption basket in the 
integrated economy depends on both inter- and intra-national inequality. Hence, we identify a demand 
channel through which inequality affects the international trade pattern. Empirical evidence from a panel of 
bilateral trade data among 57 countries, for which adequate income distribution measures exist, and 
spanning three decades supports the conjecture that high inequality in a trading partner yields less bilateral 
trade flows through lower imports, after controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
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1   Introduction 
 
The dynamics of innovation and imitation between industrialized and less developed regions 
have been investigated in various contexts. The life-cycle structure of the location choice for 
production of newly invented goods over time, where relatively early manufacturing takes 
place in industrialized countries and gradually shifts to less developed countries explored by 
Vernon (1966), has been formalized in models exploring technology diffusion to emerging 
economies (See e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991). By and large, when it is not supposed 
that there is a representative consumer, the assumption of unit income elasticity is imposed 
for all consumption goods. Thus, any impact of income distribution on the level and 
composition of aggregate demand is ruled out.  
 
In this paper, the model incorporates the fact that income elasticity with respect to newly 
invented goods is larger than the income elasticity with respect to older ones. The 
assumption is that more recently introduced goods yield less utility because they satisfy less 
urgent requirements, or desires rather than needs. Then wealth distribution determines 
aggregate demand. This follows from the insight of Engel’s Law: The budget share allocated 
to necessities decreases with income. As observed by Linder (1961), once the difference in 
expenditure decisions between rich and poor consumers is acknowledged, the trade pattern 
between industrialized and less developed regions is determined not only by differentials in 
technology, factor endowment and income but also by income distribution within each 
region. To account for the impact of income distribution, we introduce nonhomothetic 
preferences in an innovation-imitation model of an integrated world economy.  
 
The specification of preferences used is that introduced Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), 
and by Zweimueller (1998) in a dynamic setting, where consumers rank goods according to a 
hierarchy of needs and desires. The configuration of demand for newer goods across 
households depends on the range of affordable consumption. Aggregate demand for 
different types of goods is determined by the income distribution within and across regions. 
The equilibrium pattern of trade is given not only by technology primitives, factor 
endowments and relative per capita incomes, that is inter-regional income distributions, as in  3
standard trade theory but also by intra-regional income distributions as pointed out by 
Linder.  
 
In the model, we assume that the distribution of wealth is unequal in the poor region and 
even in the prosperous region. This assumption is consistent with the stylized evidence on 
distribution and development. Hence, our distinction is meant to capture broad modern 
regional dichotomies of the global North-South or the European East-West type. In 
particular, we explore the effect of changes in the distribution of wealth within the poor 
region on the pattern of trade of the integrated economy. The inclusion of nonhomothetic 
preferences in the model brings about a demand channel through which income distribution, 
not only between countries but also within trading partners, affects international trade flows. 
The configuration of global exports will be determined by regional demands for different 
types of goods.  
 
The effect of wealth distribution in the less developed on trade is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, since only the rich in the less developed region can afford imported luxurious goods, 
progressive wealth redistribution leads to a contraction of trade, other things equal. This 
would occur because the redistribution of wealth is associated with an attendant fall in 
demand for relatively new goods. On the other hand, if the poor are made wealthier, their 
range of consumption increases. Then, the varieties of goods produced in the less developed 
country, and therefore exports, grow. This would occur because the redistribution of wealth 
is associated with an attendant rise in demand for more recently imitated domestic goods. 
  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 sets up 
the primitives of the model: endowments, preferences and technology. Section 4 derives the 
strategic linkages between innovators and imitators under free entry. Section 5 characterizes 
the steady-state equilibrium of the integrated economy, with particular emphasis on the 
pattern of trade and income distribution. Section 6 presents the results from the econometric 
analysis of panel data on bilateral trade flows among 57 countries over three decades on the 
impact of inequality on imports and total trade. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Related  Literature 
 
Although the impact of international inequality has featured in both the modeling and 
empirical studies of trade under nonhomothetic preferences, the impact of intra-national 
inequality has been largely neglected. The present paper aims to bridge this gap in both the 
theory and empirics of international trade. In this section, we review the existing theoretical 
and empirical research about the impact of inequality on international trade when the 
composition of household consumption depends on income, and aggregate consumption for 
each good on income distibution. 
 
2.1 Theory 
 
In his now classic treatise, Linder (1961) points out that the dependence of the composition 
of a household’s consumption basket on its income means that aggregate demand for 
different types of goods is determined by income distribution. In fact, while with homothetic 
preferences demand for any good only depends on aggregate income, with nonhomothetic 
preferences the attendant demand for new goods is higher when there are more well off 
households. Therefore, with fixed costs of innovation, countries with a higher concentration 
of wealthy households manufacture varieties of the most recent vintages. Some of these 
varieties are exported from industrialized to less developed countries if enough consumers 
find them affordable. In particular, bilateral trade will be determined not only by the 
differences in technology and endowments, as well as the similarity in aggregate incomes, but 
also by both inter- and intra-national inequality. 
 
International differences in per capita income are the focus of trade models by Markusen 
(1986) and Ramezzana (2000). The former combines monopolistic competition and factor 
endowment differentials with nonhomothetic preferences. Capital is abundant in the 
industrialized country and goods with high income elasticity are capital intensive. The latter 
model also combines monopolistic competition with nonhomothetic preferences but 
introduces transportation costs. Hence, in both models, trade is mostly among countries 
with higher per capita income. The volume of trade falls with international inequality.  
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The literature on economic development emphasizes the importance of demand expansion 
for the adoption of increasing returns technologies that are not viable in small markets. For 
example, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) highlights the key role of productive agriculture in 
generating demand for manufactures and spurring industrialization. But, as Baldwin (1956) 
points out, the aggregate demand for manufactures may not manifest itself if the wealth 
generated in agriculture is extremely concentrated. Therofore, intra-national inequality can 
affect industrial structure. 
 
The idea that the emergence of a middle class is needed, as the source of purchasing power 
for manufactures, is modeled by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). Given that agricultural 
expansion enlarges the middle class, progressive redistribution unambiguously stimulates 
industrialization through the expansion of demand that makes it possible for manufacturers 
of new varieties to cover fixed costs. A role for exports of primary goods is allowed akin to 
that of agriculture, as generators of the resources that spur industrialization. Luxury imports 
are considered as detrimental for domestic manufacturing and a negative byproduct of 
inequality. 
 
By contrast, in the model of the present paper, imports by the rich households in the less 
developed country are the counterpart of exports to the industrialized country. Without 
“luxury” imports by the rich, the less developed country manufacturers suffer a drop in their 
demand because exports cease. Furthermore, international trade facilitates adoption of 
advanced technologies by manufacturers in the less developed country.  
 
In a related model, Matsuyama (1999) considers a Ricardian model of trade in which the less 
developed country specializes in goods with low income elasticity, and the industrialized 
country has comparative advantage in goods with high income elasticity. As above, 
consumption is discrete for each good and satiation is reached after the first unit. Utility rises 
with the diversity of the consumption bundle rather than with the intensity of consumption 
of each good. While preferences are nonhomothetic, there is perfect competition. Hence, 
income distribution has impact on industrial structure only through its effect on trade, 
without any pecuniary externalities of demand to allow for start-up cost coverage.  6
Redistribution from rich to poor consumers in the less developed country reduces exports 
and imports if the ensuing rise in the terms of trade due to the shift in demand is bounded. 
 
Given that early goods provide more utility and that only the first unit of consumption of 
each good provides utility, the more rich consumers there are the higher the aggregate 
demand newer goods. In the model of this paper, like in the model of Murphy, Shleifer and 
Vishny, redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor can stimulate demand for 
domestic manufactures and increase the range of exportable goods in the less developed 
country. But also, as in Matsuyama’s model progressive redistribution reduces import 
demand from the less developed country, and therefore total trade flows. Hence, the impact 
of inequality and redistribution on international trade is ambiguous in the model of this 
paper.  
 
 
2.2 Empirics 
 
With regard to the link between the diversity of the consumption bundle and income, 
Jackson (1984) finds evidence of a positive correlation among household income and variety 
of goods in its consumption basket. Hunter and Markusen (1988) explore the link between 
national per capita income and the composition of demand. The estimation of a linear 
expenditure system for thirty four countries and eleven commodity groups yields a rejection 
of the null hypothesis of homothetic preferences at significance levels of 1%. 
   
Also, Francois and Kaplan (1996) find that the composition of imports depends on intra-
national inequality. Countries with more unequal distributions tend to import more 
consumer manufactures. However, they do not explore the effect of intra-national on either 
the level of imports or the pattern of bilateral trade. In the present paper, the importance of 
the Gini coefficient in explaining both bilateral imports and total trade flows is explored 
empirically. Even after controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity of both 
trading partners, as well as geographic location variables, the lagged Gini coefficient is 
negatively correlated with bilateral imports and the share of total bilateral exports over the 
total bilateral product.   
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Deardorff (1998) points that if preferences are nonhomothetic and goods with high income 
elasticity are capital intensive, as in Markusen (1986), the gravity model of bilateral can 
account for the direction of bilateral flows, as long as the relative per capita income is added 
as an explanatory variable. But, the prediction that capital abundant countries trade mainly 
with each other, while capital scarce countries do the same, is not borne out. For example, 
Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) find that high-income countries trade disproportionately with 
all countries, not just other high-income countries. The relevance of intra-national inequality 
is neglected in estimations of the gravity equation. In the present paper, regressions of the 
bilateral trade pattern include national inequality. 
 
 
3  The Building Blocks 
 
In this section the building blocks of the model are laid out. First, the preference structure is 
specified following Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Zweimueller (1998). We build in 
Engel's Law. Second, the endowment structure is characterized. Next, the necessary first-
order conditions implied by household optimization are used to write the individual and 
aggregate consumption functions. Finally, the innovation, imitation and manufacturing 
technologies are characterized. 
 
 
3.1 Preferences 
 
The economy is made up of two countries, A and B, populated by L
A and L
B inhabitants 
respectively. Country A is relatively more prosperous and industrialized than country B. 
Preferences are defined over consumption goods. It is assumed that all consumers, 
independently of their income and their nationality, have the same preferences. Lifetime 
utility of a household of type h in country i is given by, 
 
      () ∫
∞
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0
) ( dt e t C u U
t i
h
i
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δ , 
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which is the discounted flow of instantaneous utility from consumption of each infinitely-
lived household. 
 
There is a continuum of goods indexed by 
+ ℜ ∈ j . A hierarchy of necessity and desirability 
ranks these goods according to their priority. For all goods, we assume that there is 
indivisibility in consumption and that utility is derived only from the first unit consumed, at 
each point in time. Households consume conveniences only after basic needs are met. 
Goods satisfying necessities are indexed in the unit interval,  ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ j , and yield one unit of 
utility for the first unit consumed. All other goods  1 ≥ j  provide amenities for the first unit 
consumed, at each moment 
+ ℜ ∈ t , worth 
j
1
 units of utility. 
  
If prices are not decreasing in  j , then each household will consume goods according to the 
priority specified by the hierarchy. Given equal prices, as j increases each unit of utility from 
consumption becomes more costly. Hence, no good  1 ≥ j  will ever be demanded by a 
household until all goods indexed below j have been consumed. Although the decisión-making 
criterion has a lexicographic structure, the consumption function is continuous and otherwise well-
behaved by construction. Note that there exists a continuum of goods and that the index of last good 
consumed is pari passu a measure of consumption because only one unit of each good is consumed. 
Indeed, instantaneous utility is given by, 
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where  ) (t C
i
h  is the highest index of all goods consumed at time 
+ ℜ ∈ t .  
   
 
3.2 Endowments  
 
Each household in country A has identical financial asset holdings V
A. In country B, there 
are two types of households, rich and poor. The proportion of poor households is β . Per  9
capita wealth from financial assets is V
B. Each poor household owns wealth   
) ( ) ( t V t V
B B
P α = .  
 
Now,  
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and therefore, the financial holdings of each rich household are given by, 
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The law of motion of the state variable for each type of household is, 
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where r is the world interest rate and wages are determined nationally.
1 The prices depend 
only on the location where the goods are manufactured. Goods manufactured in country A 
are set as numeraire. Goods manufactured in Country B are cheaper and priced at  1 < p . 
The more recent the invention a good the higher its index 
+ ℜ ∈ j . The goods manufactured 
in country A are those which since their introduction have not been imitated in country B. 
We assume that  ) (t N  goods have been introduced at time 
+ ℜ ∈ t  and  ) (t M imitated. Then 
the law of motion of wealth becomes, 
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1 Labor supply is inelastic.  10
We will focus in the case in which (i) households in the relatively prosperous country A 
purchase all invented varieties, (ii) the rich but not the poor in the less developed country B 
can afford imported “luxury” goods, and (iii) the poor can afford more than the basic 
subsistence goods but not all domestically manufactured goods. Hence, we have, 
 
1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( > > > > =
B
P
B
R
A C t M t C t C t N  
 
Since utility is logarithmic, it turns out that the asset distribution is stationary under the 
present specification of preferences. In particular, the ratio of savings to the value of asset 
holdings is independent of the level of wealth. The share of wealth of each group is fixed. 
 
 
3.3  Intertemporal Optimization   
 
Consumer demand for each household type depends on the range of affordable goods. In 
particular, solving the intertemporal optimization problem of each consumer yields the 
following consumption functions, 
 
    N M p V W C
A A A = − + + = ) 1 ( δ    (1), 
 
for country A households, 
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for rich households in country B, and 
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p
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C
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B
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for poor households.
2
 
                                                 
2 We are concentrating in the steady state without growth, whih implies that   0 / = − = δ r c c D .  11
 
4 Innovation  and  Imitation 
 
To complete the specification of the primitives of the model, we provide the elements that 
determine the cost structure of manufacturing in each region. First, in the rich economy, 
there is a sunk cost stemming from the resource requirement for innovative design. The 
marginal cost of producing each unit gives the mark-up equation. Second, in the developing 
economy, there is a fixed cost associated with reverse engineering. Limit pricing together 
with the variable cost define the mark-up relationship for imitated products. These technical 
parameters together with the aggregate demand functions determine the free-entry 
equilibrium conditions in each region. 
  
 
4.1   R&D Primitives 
 
Each firm in country A has exclusive use of a blueprint. Perfect intellectual property 
protection prevails in country A. But, entrepreneurs in country B can reverse engineer a 
design without compensating the creator. The deployment cost of R&D ventures 
is ) (t F units of labor. Once a design is made, the firm can manufacture each unit using 
) (t A units of labor and acquire a monopoly position for the corresponding good. We assume 
symmetry in the technology across goods.  
 
There is an upper bound on the price to be charged by each incumbent firm. We normalize 
this limit price to unity. The limit on the price is due to potential production by a 
competitive fringe. Once invented any good can be produced using a “backyard” technology 
that has requires  ) ( / 1 t W
A  units of labor to produce each unit of output under constant 
returns, where  ) ( / 1 ) ( t W t A
A > . Hence, the incumbents’ price determines the reservation 
wage.  
 
In particular, since we have normalized the price of country A manufactures to unity, the 
marginal revenue product of labor using the “backyard” technology is  ) (t W
A . If an 
incumbent monopolist tried to bid the wage below that level, the competitive fringe could  12
enter without incurring sunk costs and offer slightly higher wages to attract all the required 
workers to serve the whole market. No incumbent will ever pay a wage lower than the 
reservation level  ) (t W
A . With a wage rate  ) (t W
A  and a price of unity, the profit flow per 
unit of output sold is  ) ( ) ( 1 t W t A
A A − = π .  
 
The following assumptions summarize the evolution of technical opportunities: 
 
  ) ( / ) ( ), ( / ) ( t N a t A t N f t F = =  and  ) ( ) ( t N w t W
A A = .  
 
We assume that productivity growth in the relatively prosperous country is driven by 
innovations. We adopt the simplest way to capture this idea by assuming that the stock of 
knowledge in the economy can be proxied by the measure of previous innovations  ) (t N  
and the labor input requirement of R&D is inversely related to this measure. Moreover, we 
assume productivity in final output production, by both incumbents and the competitive 
fringe, also increases with  ) (t N , which is an index of past manufacturing as well. 
 
Hence, efficiency in R&D and production, both manufacturing and backyard, rise pari passu 
with the number of goods introduced. Innovators, entrepreneurs and workers build upon 
experience of previous successes. The assumption about the impact of new ideas, or designs, 
on future innovators follows Romer (1990). Learning leading to higher productivity ceases if 
innovation stops, as in Young (1993). While the wage rate grows with the measure of 
previous innovations, the profit flow per unit sold remains constant over time as,  
 
                                                 
A A A aw t W t A − = − = 1 ) ( ) ( 1 π . 
  
 
4.2      Emulation Primitives 
 
 
Firms in the less developed country B do not have access to the innovation technology. To 
become manufacturers they emulate producers from the innovating country A. Imitation 
requires set-up costs of  ) (t G units of labor. After a good has been imitated in country B,  13
imitators can produce at constant marginal cost  ) ( ) ( t W t B
B , where  ) (t B  is the labor input 
necessary to produce one unit of output using the imitation technology and  ) (t W
B  is the 
wage rate in country B. We will discuss later on the endogenous determination of  ) (t W
B . 
  
Technological change for imitation activities evolves analogously to that in innovating 
activities. In particular, we assume that, 
 
  ) ( / ) ( t M g t G =  and  ) ( / ) ( t M b t B = .  
 
This characterization of the progress of emulation technologies states that efficiency is 
determined by the history of imitating activities  ) (t M . Productivity in the blueprint imitation 
and adaptation process increases as a result of learning from reverse-engineering experience. 
Successful design copying not only adds to the productivity of further imitation but also 
leads to more efficient production due to the associated increase in manufacturing 
experience. 
  
In order to be competitive in the world market, country B producers have to underbid 
country A firms. The lowest price at which country A firms are willing to sell is their 
marginal cost 
A aw . If a country B firm charges a slightly lower price, it can take over the 
whole world market and drive the country A competitors out of the market. However, the 
country B firms will only be able to do so if their marginal cost is below that of country A 
producers. Or equivalently, we assume 
B A bw aw > , where  ) ( / ) ( t M t W w
B B = denotes the 
country B wage rate normalized by the measure of previously imitated goods.
3 We obtain the 
mark-up for imitating producers by invoking limit pricing. In order to capture the market the 
imitator has to underbid the price of the current producer. The limit price (i.e., the price 
which drives the country A firm out of the market) is slightly below the marginal cost of the 
country A firm and the profits per unit sold are thus, 
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3 We will concentrate in equilibria in which the wages grow at the same rate as the other variables.  14
  
 
4.3  Innovation  
 
The free entry condition in country A is given by, 
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where  1 T  is the time at which rich consumers from country B can afford the good 
introduced at time t and  2 T is the time at which that good is imitated an all rents start 
accruing to the imitator. 
 
In general, if all variables grow at a common rate γ , we have that, 
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If we concentrate in the steady state in which no growth occurs, we have that 
δ
π
A A
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4.4    Imitation 
 
The free entry condition in country B is given by, 
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contractionary effect on world trade through the wage effect outlined. Both countries lose 
out because more expensive manufacturing of relatively old goods takes place in country A, 
thereby reducing the availability of resources for innovation. 
 
 
5  The Integrated Economy 
 
In order to characterize the steady state we have to describe the implications of our 
assumptions on preferences and technology for innovation, imitation, and trade. We 
assumed that only in country A there is access to the innovation technology. The innovation 
equilibrium is one where the present discounted value of future profits accruing from an 
innovation is equal to the fixed cost of discovery. Firms in the country B do not have access 
to the innovation technology, but there are no barriers to entry in imitation activities. The 
imitation equilibrium characterization is analogous to the free-entry condition for country A 
innovators. 
 
The values of innovation and imitation success in steady-state equilibrium were derived 
under the following conditions. Consumers choose optimally the size and the composition 
of their consumption basket. The savings are invested in assets until there are no unexploited 
profit opportunities left, in the sense that neither further incentives to innovate nor to 
imitate with higher intensity exist. Finally, labor markets have to clear and the current 
account has to balance. In the steady state without growth, current account balance entails 
trade balance.  
 
5.1  Resource Balance Constraints 
 
We find the labor market equilibrium in both countries. Since labor is the only factor of 
production, this is enough to characterize worldwide resource balance. In equilibrium, the 
manufacturing sector pays reservation wages so that labor is demanded for innovation, 
imitation and production. 
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5.1.1  The Less Developed Economy 
 
Since labor supply is inelastic, labor demand is equal to the population in labor market 
equilibrium. In particular, in country B, work is divided between reverse engineering and 
production, 
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which can be written as, 
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From here, we obtain the steady-state per capita wealth in country B as, 
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5.1.2  The Industrialized Economy 
 
In country A, the labor force is divided into R&D activities and manufacturing, with no 
“backyard” production in equilibrium.  Hence, 
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Imposing an upper bound on the mark-up of country A amounts to limiting the magnitude 
of the price of imitated manufactures. This makes them affordable to more consumers, 
thereby expanding market size for imitators, as does a large population in country B. A large 
population in country B relative to country A also ensures that there will be some demand 
for imports from country B, even if the fraction of poor households is large, while 
households from the industrialized country always consume all goods produced in the less 
developed country.  
 
The positive feedback between wage rises and manufacturing expansion in the less 
developed country illustrates the role of nonhomothetic preferences in bringing about a 
demand channel whereby income distribution determines industrial activity and the pattern 
of trade. If less inequality induces more production in the less developed country, the 
industrialized country benefits also because, as explained above, imitation stimulates 
innovation.  Yet, inequality may stimulate growth as imitation follows innovation, and in 
particular, rises in “luxury’ imports. 
 
 
5.3   The Pattern of International Trade 
 
In the steady state, this economic system is characterized by the household optimization 
rules, by the industrial organization among innovators and imitators in equilibrium, by 
resource balance, and by the balance of trade described in the last section.  
   
Now, we analyze the determinants of international trade. Total trade flows will be derived in 
terms of the primitives of the model. In particular, we want to explore the impact of the 
distribution of wealth in country B. Define total trade flows as total exports,  
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6  Evidence on Inequality and Bilateral Trade 
 
In this section, the gravity equation approach is used to analyze the impact of national inequality on 
international trade flows. First, bilateral import demand and export supply functions are fitted 
controlling for  
 
 
7 Conclusions   
 
 
Although the ambiguity in the results so far is relatively unsatisfactory, it does prove the relevance of 
incorporating nonhomotheticity in preferences in the dynamic analysis of global trade. As observed 
by Linder (1961) in his classic study, once the difference in expenditure decisions between rich and 
poor consumers is acknowledged, we conclude that the trade pattern between industrialized and 
developing regions is determined not only by factor endowment and cross-regional income 
differentials, as in the Hecksher-Olin-Samuelson and intra-industry trade models, but also by the 
income distribution within each region. The incorporation of Engel's Law into the preference 
structure has dramatic implications regarding the importance of income distribution within regions 
over both the technology diffusion and trade patterns. This feature introduces an aggregate demand 
channel which raises the possibility of multiple steady states as well as different converging paths 
even under \QTR{it}{common initial conditions}. As discussed in Section 4, stability of the 
integrated economy generically implies the existence of multiple equilibria. The latter tend to be 
Pareto rankable. Equilibria exhibiting high growth in the developing region also display high wages. 
In spite of the higher production costs entailed by high wages, higher growth is sustainable in view of 
the demand expansion associated with higher income as well as the ensuing rise in labor supply. The 
prosperous region should also benefit in view of a higher volume of trade which translates into 
higher growth. 
 
As pointed out in Section 3, by construction, the model implies balance of the capital account in 
equilibrium because there is international equalization in rates of return. However, there are 
incentives for technology transfer, which we rule out by assumption. In order to explore 
technological diffusion to emerging economies, we characterize the life-cycle structure of the 
locational choice over time for the production of sophisticated newly invented goods. In the present 
state of the model, we simply inherit the information exchange structure from dynamic North-South  23
trade models where reverse engineering is the only channel of technological diffusion. In future 
versions, we shall allow for other mechanisms whereby technical knowledge flows across boundaries. 
This will enrich our study of the evolution of the trade pattern over time, in the presence of 
nonhomothetic preferences. 
  
We could treat the stock of technical knowledge as an endowment subject to some type of factor 
price equalization. When considering technology adoption across boundaries, we must model two 
types of costs that limit the technological implementation possibilities by late adopters. First, we need 
to incorporate the resource cost entailed by the required absorptive capacity build-up. Second, we 
should build-in strategic costs due to intellectual property right protection and nondisclosure clauses 
that innovators use to limit diffusion and enhance trade secrecy. Hence, whether we model foreign 
direct investment (FDI) or trade in intermediate goods as the conduits of knowledge, the deployment 
cost provides a bound on the adoption rate. The conclusions reached should be sensitive to what we 
assume with regard to each form of information flow. For example, Romer(1994) assumes that 
intermediates are essential to implement new production methods. Hence, trade barriers to exchange 
new inputs hamper growth. Feenstra(1996), who considers the impact of trade on growth when 
knowledge flows are localized, arrives to the same conclusion. However, regarding the impact of 
FDI, because he assumes that the only benefit to the domestic economy is the generation of low-
wage jobs, he concludes that the net effect is domestic industry displacement in the short-run and 
Dutch disease in the long-run. In contrast, Romer(1993) concludes that FDI is probably the most 
efficient channel through which less developed countries can bring new technologies and enjoy from 
their propagation over time due to their nonexcludable nature. Enriching the specification of the 
technological propagation process will undoubtedly lead to more interesting results, as the 
considerations to follow suggest. 
  
A technology gap may also persist due to trade secrecy incentives. Beyond the real fixed costs 
associated with technology transplants, there exists a strategic cost to producers in the industrialized 
country to the extent that technical knowledge is not fully excludable. Although the benefit of using 
it in various set-ups stems from the fact that it is nonrival, those possessing technological 
information will try to erect barriers to its dissemination even if they are only partially successful. The 
balance of these two effects can be analyzed by studying the impact of intellectual property right 
(IPR) protection and corporate organization. For instance, Helpman(1993) studies the impact of IPR 
enforcement in a trade model with innovation-imitation dynamics. To the extent that imitation 
intensity falls, the monopoly power associated with innovation increases and growth falls. But, 
Lai(1996) has shown that if FDI is the channel of production transfer the conclusions are exactly  24
reversed. The competitive or predatory impact of imitation on innovation thus depends on the 
characteristic of the propagation process associated with different conduits of technical knowledge 
flows. 
  
The main analytical result obtained by introducing a demand channel through which income 
distribution can affect industrial evolution in a dynamic trade model is the multiplicity of equilibria, 
even under common initial conditions. This is not just a possible outcome but a highly likely one. 
Indeed, almost surely multiple equilibria and converging paths obtain because the condition required 
for the existence of a stable equilibrium is that the rate of time preference be sufficiently high while 
uniqueness requires a rate of impatience below a very small threshold. This by itself demonstrates the 
importance of nonhomothetic preferences. These multiple equilibria, arising under\QTR{it}{\ 
common initial conditions}, are generically Pareto rankable due to the correlation of a high wage 
with high growth in the developing region and the expanded trade volume for the integrated 
economy. This suggests a very strong possibility for welfare enhancing policy coordination among 
the regions which is not present in previous models assuming preference homotheticity. Cooperative 
arrangements could play a catalytic role not necessarily addressed to overhauling measures meant to 
change initial conditions but rather targeted to jump starting up the movement toward a better 
equilibrium. 
  
We are in the process of finding more positive results on the relevance of the \QTR{it}{intra}-
regional income distribution, through the impact of Engel's Law on demand, in the determination of 
the dynamic pattern of international trade. To do so, we are calibrating the model and applying 
numerical methods to simulate realistic scenarios and comparative steady state exercises.  25
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